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120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)
L Facts
Although Smith v. Robbins' was not a capital case, it does have impor-
tant implications for effective assistance of counsel in the capital context.
The Court's decision in Robbins affects virtually every facet of both the state
and federal judicial system in two ways: (1) by holding the requirements of
Anders v. California to be prophylactic and thereby opening the gate for
states to amend and potentially lessen the requirements of appellate counsel;
and (2) by deciding the case on federalism grounds and thereby setting the
stage for abandoning Miranda v. Arizona3 in favor of a return to the volun-
tariness standard.
IL Implicationsfor Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Context
A. Smith v. Robbins
In 1990, a California jury convicted Lee Robbins ("Robbins") of
second-degree murder for the fatal shooting of his former roommate.
Although Robbins represented himself at his jury trial, he received the
assistance of court-appointed counsel for purposes of appeal. Because
Robbins's appointed counsel concluded that an appeal would be frivolous,
he filed a brief with the California Court of Appeal complying with the
Wende system, California's post-Anders procedure for withdrawal by appel-
late counsel.4 Robbins also filed a pro se supplemental brief, permitted by
1. 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000).
2. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that when appointed appellate counsel wants to
withdraw (1) counsel must submit a brief to the client and the court outlining all arguable
appellate issues, (2) the defendant must have an opportunity to raise additional issues, and (3)
the court must find that all appellate issues would be frivolous were they to be raised on
appeal).
3. 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966) (holding that "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of attorney, either retained
or appointed").
4. Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2000). After concluding that an appeal
would be frivolous, counsel is required by the Wende system to: (1) file a brief summarizing
the procedural and factual history of the case; (2) indicate that he has reviewed the record; (3)
explain his review of the case to his client; (4) provide the client with a copy of his brief; and
(5) inform the client of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief. It is then the court's
responsibility to determine if there are any arguable issues to raise on appeal. Id. at 753.
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the Wende system, in which he claimed that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction and that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland.' The California Court of
Appeal affirmed Robbins's conviction and concluded that an appeal would
be frivolous.6
After exhausting state habeas proceedings, Robbins petitioned the
United States District Court for the Central District of California for habeas
corpus relief. Among the claims raised by Robbins in his federal habeas
petition was a claim that he was denied effective assistance of appellate
counsel because the Wende brief filed by his appointed counsel failed to
comply with Anders v. California. The district court found merit in Rob-
bins's claim and concluded that Robbins's appellate counsel had deviated
from the procedure set forth in Anders by failing to include at least two
arguable issues in his brief.' Deciding that counsel's deviation from Anders
resulted in deficient performance by counsel, the district court found a
presumption of prejudice and ordered that Robbins be granted a new direct
appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
that the brief filed by Robbins's appellate counsel was deficient because it
did not comply with the Anders procedure. However, rather than granting
a new direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to consider
Robbins's eleven claims of trial error!8 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the procedure adopted by California
in People v. Wende9 violated the procedure outlined by the Court in
Anders.1" The Court split five-four on the issue. Justice Thomas, writing
for the majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, concluding that the
procedure outlined by the Court in Anders was merely "a prophylactic
one."11
B. The Anders System
In Anders v. California the Court reviewed an earlier California pre-
withdrawal procedure for appointed appellate counsel. Under the old
California system, appointed appellate counsel could withdraw from a case
5. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that failure by prosecution to disclose evidence
favorable to accused upon request violates due process when the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment).
6. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 754.
7. Id. The district court found that Robbins's appellate counsel erred in failing to
brief (1) whether the prison law library was adequate for the preparation of Robbins's pro
se defense at trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its refusal to allow Robbins to
withdraw his waiver of trial counsel. Id.
8. Id. at 755.
9. 600 P.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Cal. 1979).
10. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 753.
11. Id. at 753.
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without filing an appeal after filing a letter stating that the appeal had "no
merit."12 The Court concluded that this California procedure denied defen-
dants access to process and equality as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Because a conclusory letter stating that the appeal had "no
merit" was not equivalent to a finding that the appeal was "frivolous," the
Court determined that the California system was inadequate.14 The Court
then set forth the acceptable procedure for handling the withdrawal of
appellate counsel:
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission
to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court-not
counsel-then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to
decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds[,] it may grant
counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal
requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if
state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal
points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must,
prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to arguethe appeal.1 s
In Robbins, the Ninth Circuit considered the Anders procedure to be
mandatory; 6 in subsequent decisions the court concluded that, because the
Wende system deviated from Anders, it was unconstitutional. 7 However,
the United States Supreme Court disagreed."8
C. The Wende System
In People v. Wende, California adopted a new procedure for allowing
appellate counsel to withdraw. 9 Under the Wende system, "counsel, upon
concluding that an appeal would be frivolous, files a brief with the appellate
court that summarizes the procedural and factual history of the case, with
citations of the record."" Additionally, counsel must indicate that he has
reviewed the record, explained his view of the case to his client, furnished
12. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 739 (1967).
13. Id. at 741.
14. Id. at 743.
15. Id. at 744.
16. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 756.
17. Id. at 755 n.4 (citing Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999);
Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494, 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1999)).
18. Id. at 756.




the client with a copy of his brief, and advised the client of his right to file
a pro se supplemental brief. 1 The court, rather than counsel, then searches
the record for arguable issues.22 If, after reviewing the entire record, the
appellate court determines that an appeal would be frivolous, it may affirm;
"[i]f, however, it finds an arguable (i.e., nonfrivolous) issue, it orders briefing
on that issue."23 The Wende system differs from Anders in that counsel
filing a brief under Wende does not explicitly request permission to
withdraw or comment on the merits or frivolity of an appeal.24
The Robbins Court claimed that, "[i]n addition to this double review
and double determination of frivolity, [the Wende procedure] affords a third
layer of review, through the California Appellate Projects."" However, the
Court's claim that Wende provides a "double determination of frivolity" is
in conflict with its claim that "counsel following Wende neither explicitly
states that his review has led him to conclude that an appeal would be
frivolous . . . nor requests leave to withdraw."26 The Court based its
conclusion that the Wende system provides double review of frivolity on an
assumption that counsel following Wende make an implicit determination
that an appeal would be frivolous." That assumption, however, goes against
the Court's assertion that counsel following Wende are "silent on the merits
of the case.""
The California Appellate Projects employs attorneys who are under
contract with the court to review the records and to assist appointed
appellate counsel.29 When appointed appellate counsel wish to file a Wende
brief, "an appellate project staff attorney reviews the record again to
determine whether a Wende brief is appropriate."30 Thus, although the
review procedure may not be as strict as implied by the Supreme Court, the
California Appellate Projects does provide supplemental review to the
Wende system.





25. Id. at 753 n.1.
26. Id. at 753 & n.1.
27. Id. at 753.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 753 n.1 (quoting People v. Hackett, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 228 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. Id. (quoting Hackett, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228).
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In Brown v. Warden of the Virginia State Penitentiary,31 the Supreme
Court of Virginia established the procedure for appointed appellate counsel
in Virginia to follow when counsel considers an appeal to be frivolous. 2
Adopting the procedures set forth in A nders, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held:
when an indigent's counsel conscientiously determines that an appeal to
this [c]ourt would be wholly frivolous, he must so advise this [c]ourt and
request permission to withdraw. Simultaneously with such request and
within the time allotted for perfecting an appeal, counsel shall file a
petition for appeal identifying anything in the record that arguably
might support the appeal. Counsel shall furnish his client with a copy
of the withdrawal request and of the petition for appeal."
Even if, as the Court in Wende concludes, the procedure established in
Anders is merely "a prophylactic one,"' Virginia courts should continue to
follow the Anders system. Because there is no statewide public defender
system in Virginia, court appointed lawyers must do appellate work without
state-funded assistance. There is also no system in Virginia comparable to
the California Appellate Projects. At best, the California Appellate Projects
provides a third layer of review under the Wende system; at worst, it
provides a second layer of review under Wende. Regardless, there is nothing
in Virginia that is remotely comparable to that review system. It would,
therefore, be impossible to implement the Wende system as it has been
approved by the Supreme Court in Robbins because the current conditions
in Virginia are not comparable to those in California. Because there is no
public defender system in Virginia analogous to the system in California, the
Commonwealth cannot implement the Wende system without making
substantial changes to its existing public defense system. Modifying the
existing Virginia system to comply with the conditions required by the
Wende system would pose significant financial and administrative burdens.
It is clearly in the best interests of both the courts and defendants to
retain the Anders system in Virginia. Implementing Wende in Virginia
would require the Virginia Court of Appeals to engage in a complete review
of the entire record without the assistance of a brief by counsel that it
currently enjoys under Anders. Indisputably, complete review of the entire
record by the Virginia Court of Appeals would add significant time and
financial burdens to the court." Furthermore, the role of judges in our
31. 385 S.E.2d 587 (Va. 1989).
32. Brown v. Warden of the Virginia State Penitentiary, 385 S.E.2d 587,588 (Va. 1989).
33. Id. at 589-90.
34. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 753.
35. Thirteen retired Justices of the Supreme Court of California and the Courts of
Appeal of California filed an amicus brief in Robbins in which they pointed out the "risk that
the review of the cold record [under the Wende scheme] will be more perfunctory without
the issue-spotting guidance, and associated record citations, of counsel." Robbins, 120 S. Ct.
2000] 409
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criminal justice system is not an adversarial one. The appropriate role of a
judge is that of a neutral, detached magistrate. Defense counsel are thus
better equipped than the courts to review the record in search of arguable
issues to bring on appeal. Shifting that burden to the Virginia Court of
Appeals increases the burden on the court; retaining the Anders system in
Virginia lessens that burden and avoids placing the judiciary in an
adversarial role. Because there is no obvious non-Anders or non-Wende
system that would work in Virginia, and because Wende is unworkable in
Virginia, the Commonwealth should continue to adhere to its version of the
Anders system.
IV Forecast for Dickerson and the Future of/Miranda
A. Background
On January 27, 1997, Charles T. Dickerson ("Dickerson") confessed to
robbing a number of banks in Virginia and Maryland. Dickerson was
indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of conspiracy to commit bank
robbery, three counts of bank robbery, and three counts of using a firearm
in the commission of a crime of violence.36 Shortly after his indictment,
Dickerson moved to suppress his confession because it was obtained in
violation of Miranda.7 The district court found that Dickerson's confession
was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment but suppressed the confession
on the grounds that it was in technical violation of Miranda.3" In ruling that
the confession should be suppressed, the district court did not consider
Section 3501 of the of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 ("Section
3501"), which provides that "a confession... shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given."39 In United States v. Dickerson,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted whether Section 3501,
rather than Miranda v. Arizona,41 governs the admissibility of confessions in
federal courts. 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, "[b]ased upon the
statutory language, it is evident that Congress enacted [Section] 3501 with
the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring
voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."4" If
at 771 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
36. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1985).
40. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
41. 384 U.s. 436 (1966).
42. Id. at672.
43. Id. at 671.
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Congress had the authority to enact Section 3501, Dickerson's confession
would be admissible because it was given voluntarily. 4
The question of congressional authority, the Fourth Circuit reasoned,
turned on whether the rule set forth in Miranda by the Supreme Court was
required by the federal constitution." In Miranda, the Court explained that
the warnings were not protected constitutional rights and warned that its
decision "in no way create[d] a constitutional straightjacket which [would]
handicap sound efforts at reform."4 The Court instead described the
warnings as being "procedural safeguards"4 ' and encouraged both the states
and Congress to create their own safeguards.48 In subsequent decisions, the
Court has indicated that the Miranda warnings are "prophylactic" in nature
and are therefore not required by the Constitution.49 After reviewing the
Miranda decision itself and the cases that followed it, the Fourth Circuit in
Dickerson concluded that because failure to deliver Miranda warnings does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, "the irrebuttable
presumption created by the Court in Miranda-that a confession obtained
without the warnings is presumed involuntary-is afortiori not required by
the Constitution."' According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress had the
authority to overrule Miranda and exercised that authority when it
approved the voluntariness standard embodied in Section 3501.51 The
warnings approved by the Court in Miranda are thus reduced to factors
within Section 3501 to be used by the court in determining voluntariness. 2
B. Implications ofRobbins for Dickerson
In Robbins, the Court concluded that "any view of the procedure we
described in the last section of Anders that converted it from a suggestion
into a straightjacket would contravene our established practice, rooted in
federalism, of allowing the States wide discretion, subject to the minimum
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions
to difficult problems of policy." 3 The Court's decision in Robbins was
clearly based on federalism. It is likely that the Court will rely on
federalism again-this time in the Miranda context when it decides
44. Id.
45. Id. at 687.
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
47. Id. at 444.
48. Id. at 467.
49. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 689 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,654 (1984);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
50. Id. at 690.
51. Id. at 691.
52. Id. at 692.
53. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 757.
2000]
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Dickerson.-" A decision by the Court striking down Miranda as prophylactic
would mean a return to voluntariness as the standard for determining the
admissibility of confessions.
A return to an emphasis on voluntariness could, however, be a positive
change. Under the current Miranda system, the warnings and waiver of
rights are controlling. As long as the warnings are given and the wavier of
rights is signed by the defendant, voluntariness is presumed. If Miranda is
discarded, then courts will be forced to evaluate the actual circumstances
surrounding a confession and involuntary confessions will no longer be
cloaked behind a mechanical warning and waiver of rights. However, rather
than merely abandoning Miranda, the Court will need to explain that a
return to the voluntariness test does not lower the standard or lessen the
protection afforded defendants against self-incrimination. A return to
voluntariness should instead mean a return to the basic right of protection
against self-incrimination, rather than a mechanical application of that right.
Until Dickerson is decided, counsel must take care to avoid procedural
default. All motions to suppress confessions should be grounded both on
Miranda grounds and involuntariness grounds. Then, if Miranda is
overruled, the voluntariness issue will not have been defaulted.
V Conclusion
The Court's decision in Robbins has important implications for our
entire criminal justice system. By refusing to recognize the requirements of
Anders v. California as mandatory, the decision explicitly grants the
discretion to alter the process for withdrawal of appellate counsel to the
states. Further, by deciding the case on federalism grounds, the stage is set
for the abandonment of Miranda and a return to the voluntariness standard
in the confession context.
Heather L. Necklaus
54. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (granting certiorari).
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